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disinformation” and “wholly counterfactual
accounts…widely believed by otherwise
sensible people,” states the 2010-2011 World
Nuclear Industry Status Report by Worldwatch
Institute.3 What is less well understood is the
nature of the “evidence” that gives the nuclear
industry its mandate, Cold War science which,
with its reassurances about low-dose radiation
risk, is being used to quiet alarms about
Fukushima and to stonewall new evidence that
would call a halt to the industry.

Science with a Skew: The Nuclear
Power Industry After Chernobyl and
Fukushima Japanese translation is
available
(http://peacephilosophy.blogspot.co
m/2012/03/gayle-greene-nuclearpower-industry.html).
Gayle Greene
It is one of the marvels of our time that the
nuclear industry managed to resurrect itself
from its ruins at the end of the last century,
when it crumbled under its costs, inefficiencies,
and mega-accidents. Chernobyl released
hundreds of times the radioactivity of the
Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs combined,
contaminating more than 40% of Europe and
the entire Northern Hemisphere. 1 But along
came the nuclear lobby to breathe new life into
the industry, passing off as “clean” this energy
source that polluted half the globe. The “fresh
look at nuclear”—in the words of a New York
Times makeover piece (May 13, 2006)2—paved
the way to a “nuclear Renaissance” in the
United States that Fukushima has by no means
brought to a halt.

Consider these damage control pieces from
major media:
• The “miniscule quantities” of
radiation in the radioactive plume
spreading across the U.S. pose “no
health hazard,” assures the
Department of Energy (William
Broad, “Radiation over U.S. is
Harmless, Officials Say,” NYT,
March 22, 2011).
• “The risk of cancer is quite low,
lower than what the public might
expect,” explains Evan Douple,
head of the Radiation Effects
Research Foundation (RERF),
which has studied the A-bomb
survivors and found that “at very
low doses, the risk was also very
low” (Denise Grady, “Radiation is
everywhere, but how to rate

That mainstream media have been powerful
advocates for nuclear power comes as no
surprise. “The media are saturated with a
skilled, intensive, and effective advocacy
campaign by the nuclear industry, resulting in
1
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harm?” NYT, April 5, 2011).

the tides, seeps into earth and groundwater,
and makes its way into the food chain and into
us, adding to the sum total of cancers and birth
defects throughout the world. Its legacy is for
longer than civilization has existed; plutonium,
with its half life of 24,000 years, is, in human
terms, forever.

• An NPR story a few days after
the Daiichi reactors destabilized
quotes this same Evan Douple
saying that radiation levels around
the plant “should be reassuring. At
these levels so far I don’t think a
study would be able to measure
that there would be any health
effects, even in the future.” (“Early
radiation data from near plant ease
health fears,” Richard Knox and
Andrew Prince,” March 18, 2011)
The NPR story, like Grady’s piece
(above), stresses that the Radiation
Effects Research Foundation has
had six decades experience
studying the health effects of
radiation, so it ought to know.

What is this Radiation Effects Research
Foundation, and on what “science” does it base
its reassuring claims?
*******
The Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission
(ABCC), as it was originally called, began its
studies of the survivors five years after the
bombings. (It was renamed the Radiation
Effects Research Foundation in the mid
seventies, to get the “atomic bomb” out, at
around the same time the Atomic Energy
Commission (AEC) was renamed the
Department of Energy (DOE). Japan, which has
the distinction of being twice nuked, first as
our wartime enemy then in 2011 as our ally and
the recipient of our GE reactors, has also been
the population most closely studied for
radiation-related effects, for the Hiroshima and
Nagasaki bombings created a large, readymade population of radiation-exposed humans.
“Ah, but the Americans—they are wonderful,”
exclaimed Japan’s radiation expert Tsuzuki
Masao, who lamented that he’d had only
rabbits to work on: “It has remained for them
to conduct the human experiment!”5

• British journalist George
Monbiot, environmentalist turned
nuclear advocate, in a much
publicized debate with Helen
Caldicott on television and in the
Guardian, refers to the RERF data
as “scientific consensus,” citing,
again, their reassurances that low
dose radiation incurs low cancer
risk.4
Everyone knows that radiation at high dose is
harmful, but the Hiroshima studies reassure
that risk diminishes as dose diminishes until it
becomes negligible. This is a necessary belief if
the nuclear industry is to exist, because
reactors release radioactive emissions not only
in accidents, but in their routine, day-to-day
operations and in the waste they produce. If
low-dose radiation is not negligible, workers in
the industry are at risk, as are people who live
in the vicinity of reactors or accidents—as is all
life on this planet . The waste produced by
reactors does not “dilute and disperse” and
disappear, as industry advocates would have us
believe, but is blown by the winds, carried by

The ABCC studied but did not treat radiation
effects, and many survivors were reluctant to
identify themselves as survivors, having no
wish to bare their health problems to US
investigators and become mired in bureaucracy
and social stigma. But sufficient numbers did
voluntarily come forth to make this the
largest—and longest—study of radiation-related
health effects ever. No medical study has had
such resources lavished on it, teams of
2
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propaganda.7

scientists, state of the art equipment: this was
Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) funding.
Since it is assumed in epidemiology that the
larger the sample, the greater the statistical
accuracy, there has been a tendency to accept
these data as the gold standard of radiation
risk.

The issue of radiation poisoning was
particularly sensitive, since it carried a taint of
banned weaponry, like poison gas. The A-bomb
was not “an inhumane weapon,” declared
General Leslie Groves, who had headed the
Manhattan project.8 The first western scientists
allowed in to the devastated cities were under
military escort, ordered in by Groves. The first
western journalists allowed in were similarly
under military escort. Australian journalist
Wilfred Burchett, who managed to get in to
Hiroshima on his own, got a story out to a
British paper, describing people who were
dying “mysteriously and horribly” from “an
unknown something which I can only describe
as the atomic plague… dying at the rate of 100
a day,” General MacArthur ordered him out of
Japan; his camera, with film shot in Hiroshima,
9
mysteriously disappeared.
“No Radioactivity in Hiroshima Ruin,”
proclaimed a New York Times headline, Sept
13, 1945. “Survey Rules out Nagasaki
Dangers,” stated another headline:
“Radioactivity after atomic bomb is only 1000th
of that from luminous dial watch,” Oct 7,
1945.10 There were powerful political incentives
to downplay radiation risk. As State
Department Attorney William H. Taft asserted,
the “mistaken impression” that low-level
radiation is hazardous has the “potential to be
seriously damaging to every aspect of the
Department of Defense’s nuclear weapons and
nuclear propulsion programs…it could impact
the civilian nuclear industry… and it could raise
questions regarding the use of radioactive
substances in medical diagnosis and
treatment.”11 A pamphlet issued by the Atomic
Energy Commission in 1953 “insisted that lowlevel exposure to radiation ‘can be continued
indefinitely without any detectable bodily
change.’”12 The AEC was paying the salaries of
the ABCC scientists and monitoring them
“closely—some felt too closely,” writes Susan
Lindee in Suffering Made Real, which

ABCC examination of Hiroshima victim
The Japanese physicians and scientists who’d
been on the scene told horrific stories of people
who’d seemed unharmed, but then began
bleeding from ears, nose, and throat, hair
falling out by the handful, bluish spots
appearing on the skin, muscles contracting,
leaving limbs and hands deformed. When they
tried to publish their observations, they were
ordered to hand over their reports to US
authorities. Throughout the occupation years
(1945-52) Japanese medical journals were
heavily censored on nuclear matters. In late
1945, US Army surgeons issued a statement
that all people expected to die from the
radiation effects of the bomb had already died
and no further physiological effects due to
radiation were expected. 6 When Tokyo radio
announced that even people who entered the
cities after the bombings were dying of
mysterious causes and decried the weapons as
“illegal” and “inhumane,” American officials
dismissed these allegations as Japanese
3
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atom.” Stewart was defunded and defamed.

documents the political pressures that shaped
radiation science.13 (Other good sources on the
making of this science are Sue Rabbit Roff’s
Hotspots, Monica Braw’s The Atomic Bomb
Suppressed, and Robert Lifton and Greg
Mitchell’s, Hiroshima in America). The New
York Times “joined the government in
suppressing information on the radiation
sickness of survivors” and consistently
downplayed or omitted radioactivity from its
reportage, as Beverly Ann Deepe Keever
demonstrates in The New York Times and the
14
Bomb. Keever, a veteran journalist herself,
writes that “from the dawn of the atomic-bomb
age,…the Times almost single-handedly shaped
the news of this epoch and helped birth the
acceptance of the most destructive force ever
created,” aiding the “Cold War cover-up” in
minimizing and denying the health and
environmental consequences of the a-bomb and
its testing.

Alice Stewart
She persisted in her criticisms of the Hiroshima
data which were repeatedly invoked to
discredit her findings, pointing out that there
was no way the survivors could have returned
to “normal” a mere five years after the atomic
blasts. This was not a normal or representative
population: it was a population of healthy
survivors, since the weakest had died off. Her
studies of childhood cancer had found that
children incubating cancer became 300 times
more infection sensitive than normal children.
Children so immune-compromised would not
have survived the harsh winters that followed
the bombings, when food and water were
contaminated, medical services ground to a
halt, and antibiotics were scarce—but their
deaths would not have been recorded as
radiation-related cancer deaths. Nor would the
numerous stillbirths, spontaneous abortions,
and miscarriages (known effects of radiation
exposure) have been so recorded. Stewart
maintained that were many more deaths from
radiation exposure than official figures
indicated.

The Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission
scientists calculated that by 1950, when the
commission began its investigations, the death
rate from all causes except cancer had
returned to “normal” and the cancer deaths
were too few to cause alarm.15
*******
“It’s nonsense, it’s rubbish!” protested
epidemiologist Dr. Alice Stewart, an early
critic—and victim—of the Hiroshima studies.16
Stewart discovered, in 1956, that x-raying
pregnant women doubled the chance of a
childhood cancer: this put her on a collision
course with ABCC/RERF data, which found no
excess of cancer in children exposed in utero to
the blasts. Nobody in the 1950s wanted to hear
that a fraction of the radiation dose “known” to
be safe could kill a child. During the Cold War,
officials were assuring us we could survive allout nuclear war by ducking and covering under
desks and the U.S. and U.K. governments were
pouring lavish subsidies into “the friendly

Besides, the survivors had been exposed to a
single, external blast of radiation, often at very
high dose (depending on their distance from
4
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the bombs), rather than the long, slow, lowdose exposure that is experienced by people
living near reactors or workers in the nuclear
industry. Stewart’s studies of the Hanford
nuclear workers were turning up cancer at
doses “known to be too low” to produce cancer,
too low as defined by the Hiroshima data: “This
is the population you ought to be studying to
find out the effects of low-dose radiation,” she
maintained, not only because the workers have
been subjected to the kind of exposure more
likely to be experienced by downwinders to
reactors and accidents, but also because
records were kept of their exposures (the
nuclear industry requires such records).

calculations about the cancer effect of
radiation, and not only the cancer effect, but
many other effects –immune system damage,
lowered resistance to disease, infection, heart
disease, genetic damage. These are serious
misrepresentations because they suggest it’s
safe to increase levels of background
radiation.” In fact, as the Hiroshima studies
went on, they turned up numerous radiation
17
effects besides cancer —cardiovascular and
gastrointestinal damage, eye diseases, and
other health problems—which bore out her
prediction. Stewart was also proved right on
the issue of fetal X-rays, though it took her two
decades to convince official bodies to
recommend against the practice, during which
time doctors went right on X-raying pregnant
women. It took her another two decades to
build a case strong enough to persuade the US
government, in 1999, to grant compensation to
nuclear workers for cancer incurred on the
job.18 (It helps, in this area, to be long-lived, as
she commented wryly).
Twice, she has demonstrated that radiation
exposures assumed “too low” to be dangerous
carry high risk—two major blows at the
Hiroshima data. Yet this 60-year old RERF data
set continues to be invoked to dismiss new
evidence—evidence of cancer clusters in the
vicinity of nuclear reactors and findings from
Chernobyl.

Worker with radioactive waste at Hanford
In the Hiroshima and Nagasaki studies, by
contrast radiation exposure was estimated on
the flimsiest of guesswork. The radiation
emitted by the bombs was calculated according
to tests done in the Nevada desert and was
recalculated several times in subsequent
decades. Researchers asked such questions as,
where were you standing in relation to the
blast, what was between you and it, what had
you had for breakfast that morning, assuming
that the survivors would give reliable accounts
five years after the event.

*******
More than 40 studies have turned up clusters
of childhood leukemia in the vicinity of nuclear
facilities, reckons Ian Fairlie, an independent
consultant on radioactivity in the environment
and a former member of the Committee
Examining Radiation Risks of Internal Emitters
(an investigatory commission established by the
U.K. government but disbanded in 2004).
Fairlie describes this as a “mass of evidence
difficult to contradict”19—yet it continues to be
contradicted, on the basis of the Hiroshima

“Bible arithmetic!” Stewart called the
Hiroshima data: “it has skewed subsequent
5
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studies. Generally when a cancer cluster is
detected in the neighborhood of a reactor, the
matter gets referred to a government
committee that dismisses the findings on the
grounds that radioactive emissions from
facilities are “too low” to produce a cancer
effect—“too low, according to RERF risk
estimates.20
But in 2007, something extraordinary
happened, when a government-appointed
committee formed in response to the pressure
of concerned citizens turned up increased rates
of childhood leukemia in the vicinity of all 16
nuclear power plants in Germany. The
Kinderkrebs in der Umgebung von
Kernkraftwerken study, known by its acronym
KiKK, was a large, well-designed study with a
case-control format (1592 cancer cases and
4735 controls). The investigators—who were
not opposed to nuclear power—anticipated
they’d find “no effect... on the basis of the usual
models for the effects of low levels of
radiation.”21 But they found, to their surprise,
that children who lived less than 5 km from a
plant were more than twice as likely to develop
leukemia as children who lived more than 5 km
away. This was inexplicable within current
models of estimating radiation risk:22 emissions
would have had to have been orders of
magnitude higher than those released by the
power stations to account for the rise in
leukemia. So the investigators concluded that
the rise in leukemia couldn’t have been caused
by radiation.

The findings are not inexplicable, explains
Fairlie, when you understand that the data on
which risk is calculated, the Hiroshima studies,
are “unsatisfactory.” 23 Fairlie’s criticism of
these data echoes Stewart’s: “risk estimates
from an instantaneous external blast of high
energy neutrons and gamma rays are not really
applicable to the chronic, slow, internal
exposures from the low-range alpha and beta
radiation from most environmental releases.”24
(my emphasis) Fairlie points out a further
problem with the Hiroshima data: its failure to
take into account the dangers of internal
radiation. As Sawada Shoji, emeritus professor
of physics at Nagoya University and a
Hiroshima survivor, confirms, the Hiroshima
studies never looked at fallout: they looked at
“gamma rays and neutrons emitted within a
minute of the explosion,” but did not consider
the effects of residual radiation over time,
effects from inhalation or ingestion that “are
more severe.” 2 5 The distinction between
external and internal radiation is important to
6
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keep clear. A bomb blast gives off radiation in
the form of high-energy subatomic particles
and materials that remain as fallout in the form
of radioactive elements such as strontium 90
and cesium. Most of this is likely to remain on
the ground, where it will radiate the body from
without, but some may be ingested or inhaled
and lodge in a lung or other organ, where it will
continue to emit radioactivity at close range.
Nuclear proponents cite background radiation
to argue that low-dose radiation is relatively
harmless, asserting (as Monbiot argued against
Caldicott) that we’re daily exposed to
background radiation and survive. But this
argument misses the fact that background
radiation is from an external source and so is a
more finite exposure than radioactive
substances ingested or inhaled, which go on
irradiating tissues, “giving very high doses to
small volumes of cells,” as Helen Caldicott
says. (Caldicott explains, when physicists talk
about “permissible doses,” “[t]hey consistently
ignore internal emitters — radioactive elements
from nuclear power plants or weapons tests
that are ingested or inhaled into the body,…
They focus instead on generally less harmful
external radiation from sources outside the
body.”26)

looking at the new evidence. The world is flat.
So is it flat in Chernobyl.
*******
“There is no evidence of a major public health
impact attributable to radiation exposure two
decades after the accident at Chernobyl,”
announced the New York Times, a few days
after the Fukushima reactors began to
destabilize (Denise Grady, “Precautions should
limit health problems from nuclear plant’s
radiation,” March 15, 2011) The Times bases
this claim on a 2005 World Health Organization
(WHO) study that found “minimal health
effects” and estimated that only 4000 deaths
“will probably be attributable to the accident
ultimately.” The worst effect of the accident is
a “paralyzing fatalism,” an expert tells the
Times, which leads people to “drug and alcohol
use, and unprotected sex and unemployment”
(Elisabeth Rosenthal, “Experts find reduced
effects of Chernobyl,”Sept 6, 2005).
“Radiophobia,” this is called—an attitude
problem.
The Times did not mention that the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA),
which is mandated with the promotion of
nuclear energy, has an agreement with WHO
that gives it final say over what it reports, an
entangling alliance much decried by
independent scientists.29 Nor did it mention two
other studies that came out in 2006, “The
Other Report on Chernobyl” and “The
Chernobyl Catastrophe” by Greenpeace, both
of which gave much higher casualty estimates
30
than the widely publicized WHO/IAEA report.
Nor did it breathe a word about
Chernobyl: Consequences of the Catastrophe
for People and the Environment, by Alexey
Yablokov et al., translated into English and
published by the New York Academy of
Sciences in 2009—which estimates casualties
at 985,000, orders of magnitude more than the
WHO/IAEA report.31

The KiKK study “commands attention,” Fairlie
27
insists. But it got no mention in mainstream
media in the U.S. or the U.K.—until The
Guardian, in early May of 2011, gave this spin
to it: “Plants have been cleared of causing
childhood cancers,” declared the headline.28
“Government’s advisory committee says it is
time to look elsewhere for causes of leukaemia
clusters.” What “elsewhere,” what other causes
are cited for cancer clusters in the vicinity of
reactors? Infection, a virus, a mosquito,
socioeconomics, chance say the experts quoted
in The Guardian. The U.K. government is now
moving ahead with plans to build eight new
reactors.
When new evidence comes into conflict with
old models, reinvoke the old models rather than
7
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Yablokov et al. draw on “data generated by
many thousands of scientists, doctors, and
other experts who directly observed the
suffering of millions affected by radioactive
fallout in Belarus, Ukraine, and Russia,” and
incorporate more than 5000 studies, mostly in
Slavic languages (compared with the 350
mentioned in the 2005 report, most of which
were in English). The authors are impeccably
credentialed: Dr. Alexey Yablokov was
environmental advisor to Yeltsin and
Gorbachev; Dr. Vassily Nesterenko was former
director of the Institute of Nuclear Energy in
Belarus. Nesterenko, together with Andrei
Sakharov, founded the independent Belarusian
Institute of Radiation Safety BELRAD, which
studies –as well as treats—the Chernobyl
children. When he died in 2008 as a result of
radiation exposure incurred flying over the
burning reactor (which gave us the only
measurement of radionuclides released by the
accident), his son Dr. Alexey Nesterenko, third
author of this study, took over as director and
senior scientist at BELRAD. Dr. Janette
Sherman, consulting editor, is a physician and
toxicologist.

morbidity and mortality… increased occurrence
of tumor and immunodeficiencies, decreased
life expectancy, early aging, changes in blood
and the circulatory system, malformations.”

Comparing contaminated areas of Belarus,
Ukraine, and Russia with the so-called “clean
areas,” the studies document significant
increases in morbidity and mortality in
contaminated regions: not only more cancer,
especially thyroid cancer, but a wide array of
noncancer effects — ulcers, chronic pulmonary
diseases, diabetes mellitus, eye problems,
severe mental retardation in children, and a
higher incidence and greater severity of
infectious and viral diseases. Every system in
the body is adversely affected: cardiovascular,
reproductive, neurological, hormonal,
respiratory, gastrointestinal, musculoskeletal,
and immune systems. The children are not
thriving: “Prior to 1985 more than 80% of
children in the Chernobyl territories of Belarus,
Ukraine, and European Russia were healthy;
today fewer than 20% are well.” In animals,
too, there are “significant increases in

Parallels between Chernobyl and Hiroshima are
striking: data collection was delayed,
information withheld, reports of on-the-spot
observers were discounted, independent
scientists were denied access “The USSR
authorities officially forbade doctors from
connecting diseases with radiation and, like the
Japanese experience, all data were classified.”
With the “liquidators,” as they’re called, the
830,000 men and women conscripted from all
over the Soviet Union to put out the fire,
deactivate the reactor, and clean up the sites,
“It was officially forbidden to associate the
diseases they were suffering from with
radiation.” “The official secrecy that the USSR
imposed on Chernobyl’s public health data the
first days after the meltdown… continued for
more than three years,” during which time
“secrecy was the norm not only in the USSR,
but in other countries as well.”

After Chernobyl
Photo by Paul Fusco

8
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But the parallels are political, not biological, for
the Hiroshima data have proven to be an
“outdated” and useless model, as Stewart said,
for predicting health effects from low-dose,
chronic radiation exposure over time. The
Hiroshima studies find little genetic damage in
the survivors, yet Yablokov et al. document that
“Wherever there was Chernobyl radioactive
contamination, there was an increase in the
number of children with hereditary anomalies
and congenital malformations. These included
previously rare multiple structural impairments
of the limbs, head, and body,” devastating birth
defects, especially in the children of the
liquidators. The correlation with radioactive
exposure is so pronounced as to be “no longer
an assumption, but…proven,” write the
authors. As in humans, so in every species
studied, “gene pools of living creatures are
actively transforming, with unpredictable
consequences”: “It appears that [Chernobyl’s
irradiation] has awakened genes that have
been silent over a long evolutionary time.” The
damage will play out for generations — “at
least seven generations.”

Mikhail Malko, a researcher at the Joint
Institute of Power and Nuclear Research in
32
Belarus. But rather than using new evidence
to enlarge their understanding, experts have
found ways of dismissing these studies as
“unscientific”: they are said to be observational
rather than properly controlled, “Eastern
European” and not up to Western scientific
protocols, and inconsistent with the hallowed
Hiroshima data. Radiation scientists denied
that the thyroid cancer that increased
exponentially after the accident could be a
consequence of radiation: it manifested in only
three years, whereas it had taken ten years to
appear in Hiroshima, and it took a more
aggressive form. They explained the increase in
terms of improved screening, iodine substances
used to treat the children, or pesticides—even
though epidemiological studies kept turning up
a link with radiation contamination. Finally in
2005, a case-control study headed by Elisabeth
Cardis confirmed a dose-response relationship
between radiation and thyroid cancer in
children in terms that had to be
acknowledged. 3 3
Chernobyl does not usually provide the kind of
neat laboratory conditions that allow such
precise dose-response calculations. But neither
did Hiroshima, where radiation exposure was
guesstimated years after the fact and
recalculated several times according to new
findings. Yet scientists have accepted the
Hiroshima uncertainties –all too readily— and
have allowed this data to shape policy affecting
all life on this planet, while citing the less-thanideal conditions for studying Chernobyl as an
excuse to ignore or discredit these findings,
dismissing them according to a model more
questionable than the data they’re discounting.
The Chernobyl effects demonstrate that “Even
the smallest excess of radiation over that of
natural background will statistically…affect the
health of exposed individuals or their
descendants, sooner or later.” But as with
Stewart’s findings about fetal x-rays and
nuclear workers, as with the studies that turn

Chernobyl legacy
Photo by Paul Fusco
Such findings have provided radiation experts a
chance to reexamine their hypotheses and
theories about radiation effects, observes
9
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up cancer clusters around reactors, so with
Chernobyl — it can’t be radiation that’s
producing these effects because the Hiroshima
studies say it can’t. As independent scientist
Rudi Nussbaum points out, the “dissonance
between evidence and existing assumptions
about… radiation risk,” the gap between new
information and the “widely adopted
presuppositions about radiation health effects,”
34
has become insupportable.
Chernobyl is a better predictor of the
Fukushima consequences than Hiroshima, but
we wouldn’t know that from mainstream media.
Perhaps we would rather not know that 57% of
Chernobyl contamination went outside the
former USSR; that people as far away as
Oregon were warned not to drink rainwater
“for some time”; that thyroid cancer doubled in
Connecticut in the six years following the
accident; that 369 farms in Great Britain
remained contaminated 23 years after the
catastrophe; that the German government
compensates hunters for wild boar meat too
contaminated to be eaten35 – and it paid four
times more in compensation in 2009 than in
2007. Perhaps we’d rather not consider the
possibility that “the Chernobyl cancer toll is
one of the soundest reasons for the ‘cancer
epidemic’ that has been afflicting humankind
since the end of the 20th century.”

“We need to quash any stories trying to
compare this [Fukushima] to Chernobyl,”
“otherwise it could have adverse consequences
on the market.” “’This has the potential to set
the nuclear industry back globally…We really
need to show the safety of nuclear,” that “it’s
not as bad as it looks.” These statements were
made in a few of the more than 80 emails which
the Guardian got access to, which were not
intended for the public eye. “British
government officials approached nuclear
companies to draw up a co-ordinated public
relations strategy to play down the Fukushima
nuclear accident just two days after the
earthquake and tsunami,” reports the
Guardian, “to try to ensure the accident did not
derail their plans for a new generation of
nuclear stations in the UK.”37

“This information must be made available to
the world,” write Yablokov et al. But their book
has met “mostly with silence,” as he said in a
press conference in Washington DC, March 15,
2011.36 The silence of mainstream media has
stonewalled information about Chernobyl’s
health effects as effectively as the Soviets’
blackout concealed the accident itself, and as
the Allies’ censorship hid the health effects of
the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings.

Comparisons with Chernobyl have been
conspicuously absent from mainstream media,
even when Fukushima was upgraded, in early

*******
10
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June, to a level on a par with Chernobyl, level
7, the highest. Even when Arnold Gundersen, a
nuclear engineer turned whistleblower who has
been monitoring Fukushima from the start,
asserted that this accident may actually be
more dire than Chernobyl. Gundersen, an
informed, level-headed commentator who
inspires confidence, points out that there are
four damaged reactors leaking into the
atmosphere, ocean, and ground in an area
more populated than the Ukraine: “You
probably have the equivalent of 20 nuclear
reactor cores…that is 20 times the potential to
be released than Chernobyl.” (Fairewinds, June
16, 2011). But apart from the damage control
piece it published March 15 (cited above) and
Helen Caldicott’s passing reference to
“research by scientists in Eastern Europe” (oped, “After Fukushima: Enough is enough,”
December 2)—the Times has barely mentioned
Chernobyl (and even Caldicott did not mention
the Yablokov study by name). What Chernobyl
has wrought, which has been documented so
clearly by Yablokov et al., is simply too
dangerous to give press to, undercutting as it
does the nuclear industry’s claims to safety and
viability.

2011) and on grass-roots initiatives to gather
data where bureaucrats failed (Hiroko Tabuchi,
“Citizens’ testing finds 20 radioactive hot spots
around Tokyo,” Aug 1, 2011). Tabuchi even
takes a swipe at the “tameness of Japanese
mainstream media,” which is commendable,
though her statement is a model of “tameness”
compared to Nicola Liscutin’s denunciation of
Japanese mass media as “little more than the
38
mouthpiece of the government and TEPCO.”
Human interest stories abound in the Times,
as in other major media, stories of workers sent
in to quiet the reactors, of people living in the
vicinity of the reactors. In one such piece, “Life
in limbo for Japanese near damage nuclear
plant,” May 2, 2011, Fackler and Matthew
Wald refer to “a lack of hard data about the
health effects of lower radiation doses
delivered over extended periods” – a “lack”
that’s assured, as we’ve seen, by the
stonewalling of evidence endemic in the media.
As laudable as some of the Times coverage has
been, what it targets is the ineptitude and
corruption of the Japanese, what happened
over there as opposed to what goes on here,
where our own dirty linen remains unwashed,
as it were, and out of sight. How much easier to
criticize the lax regulatory mechanisms and
lack of transparency of the Japanese than to
shine a light on ourselves, on the insidious but
largely invisible working of the nuclear lobby
and lobbyists in this country, on the complicity
of our own government and media with the
nuclear industry.

*******
The New York Times has done good reporting
on Japanese blunders and corruption. It has
described the way plant operators and
government officials minimized the severity of
the meltdown, the corporate and government
cover-ups and irresponsibility (Norimitsu
Onishi and Martin Fackler, “Japan held nuclear
data, leaving evacuees in peril,” August 8,
2011). It has pointed out complicity between
industry and regulators (Norimitsu Onishi and
Ken Belson, “Culture of Complicity Tied to
Stricken Nuclear Plant,” April 27, 2011). It has
done pieces on citizens’ opposition (Onishi and
Fackler, “Japan ignored or long hid nuclear
risks,” May 17, 2011; Ken Belson, “Two voices
are heard after years of futility”, August 19,

A fascinating expose by Norimitsu Onishi,
“Safety myth left Japan ripe for nuclear crisis”
(June 25, 2011), invites comment along these
lines. Onishi investigates the “elaborate
advertising campaigns” led by Tepco and the
Ministry of Economy to convince the public of
the safety of nuclear power. Hundreds of
millions of dollars were spent to rally support:
“Over several decades, Japan’s nuclear
establishment has devoted vast resources to
persuade the Japanese public of the safety and
11
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necessity of nuclear power. Plant operators
built lavish, fantasy-filled public relations
buildings that became tourist attractions.” In
one of these, “Alice discovers the wonders of
nuclear power. The Caterpillar reassures Alice
about radiation and the Cheshire Cat helps her
learn about the energy source”.
Lest we feel smug, recall the promotion of “the
friendly atom” by Walt Disney’s book and film,
Our Friend the Atom, read and viewed by
millions of schoolchildren (when they weren’t
doing “duck and cover” drills).
“Millions of kits of atomic energy information
literature were distributed to elementary, high
school, and college students.” The public
relations departments of reactor manufacturers
such as Westinghouse and General Electric
were also mobilized to prepare communities for
nuclear facilities coming soon to their
neighborhoods and to prime the general
population to welcome the new technology. The
connection with mainstream media could
hardly be more direct, since “Westinghouse
owned CBS for many years, and General
40
Electric, NBC,” as Karl Grossman points out.
This same PR apparatus has been busy, in
recent decades, conjuring the “nuclear
renaissance” from the ashes of Chernobyl,
selling nuclear power as “clean, green, and
safe.”

What Onishi describes as happening in Japan
happened in the U.S. as well— perhaps Onishi
means to evoke such resonances— where a
powerful propaganda campaign was launched,
with hundreds of millions of dollars behind it,
to promote “Atoms for Peace,” the new energy
source “too cheap to meter” (though there was
nothing “cheap” about it: it required enormous
government subsidies, and still does). This
propaganda machine is described in the 1982
study Nukespeak: The Selling of Nuclear
Technology in America: “Beginning in the
mid-1950s, the AEC conducted a huge public
relations operation to promote the vision of
Atoms for Peace,” using “a wide range of PR
techniques, including films, brochures, TV,
radio, nuclear science fairs, public speakers,
traveling exhibits, and classroom
demonstrations” (traveling AEC exhibits with
names like “Power Unlimited,” “Fallout in
Perspective,” and “The Useful Atom”).39

The Times coverage of Fukushima has raised
hopes in some quarters that this current
disaster may have opened a space for public
debate in mainstream media about nuclear
power. But how real is this debate, when so
many fundamental issues remain hidden? How
open a discussion can this be, when Chernobyl
and the German reactor study go unmentioned,
when we have to turn to alternative media to
learn that the Yablokov study even exists—or to
learn that, as Alexander Cockburn reports,41
Obama was the recipient of generous campaign
contributions from the nuclear industry (which
may cast some light on his enthusiastic support
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of nuclear power)? How open a discussion is
this, when the ABCC/RERF radiation risk
assessments that enable the industry to exist
remain unaddressed? A serious consideration
of the Yablokov study and the German reactor
study would reveal them to be “skewed” and
useless, as we’ve seen; but rather than go this
route, the Times calls on RERF experts to do
damage control for the industry. So RERF
reassurances about radiation risk remain
unchallenged and in place as the invisible
buttressing of the nuclear industry, as the basis
of radiation safety standards throughout the
world.

tracing, except to whisk it away as presenting
“no health hazard” (Broad, cited above), though
the worldwide fallout from Fukushima has
occasioned much discussion on the Web.
Gundersen 43 cites evidence that the early
releases, which were revealed to be more than
double what we were initially informed,
contained “hot particles” of cesium, strontium,
uranium, plutonium, cobalt 60 that have turned
up in automobile engine filters, and according
to what’s been detected in air filters, a person
in Tokyo was breathing about ten hot particles
a day through the month of April. A person in
Seattle was breathing about five, that same
month.

Contrast the response of U.S. media to the
response of the German press: “Fukushima
marks the end of the nuclear era” (Spiegel,
March 14, 2011); “Germany can no longer
pretend nuclear power is safe…. it is over.
Done. Finished.” (March 14, 2011) To Spiegel,
Fukushima is a warning that cries out for an
end to nuclear power; to the Times, Fukushima
is a warning that we should build our reactors
more efficiently and regulate them more
carefully, rather than cease building them at all
(Editorial, “In the wake of Fukushima,” July 23,
2011). In the months after Fukushima,
“Spiegel’s most popular online feature as the
drama unfolded was an evolving digital map of
42
the ‘radiation plume,’” observes Ralph Martin;
“the German electorate made nuclear power
their top concern—they made Fukushima
theirs,” whereas “the reaction of American
media…[was to] regard the events as yet
another story, without any larger social
ramifications,” without much relevance to
ourselves. And so nuclear power marches on:
“Alabama nuclear reactor, partly built, to be
finished,” Matthew Wald, August 19, 2011;
“Two utilities win approval for nuclear power
plants,” Matthew Wald, December 23, 2011
(neither of these is a particularly long or
noticeable article, and neither is front page).

*******
Not to worry: “The effects of radiation do not
come to people that are happy and laughing.
They come to people that are weak-spirited,
that brood and fret.” So says Dr. Yamashita
Shunichi,44 who has been assigned to head the
official study of radiation health effects in the
Fukushima population. Yamashita was sent by
the Japanese government from Nagasaki
University, where he was part of the RERF
studies, revered for their long experience with
the A-Bomb survivors. Mandated with
addressing the concerns of the citizens and
correcting their misconceptions, Yamashita
rallies the population with stirring words: “The
name Fukushima will be widely known
throughout the world…This is great!
Fukushima has beaten Hiroshima and
Nagasaki. From now on, Fukushima will
become the world number 1 name. A crisis is
an opportunity. This is the biggest opportunity.
Hey, Fukushima, you’ve become famous
without any efforts.”
We’re in good hands.

There has been precious little mention in U.S.
mainstream media of the plume Spiegel was
13
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